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INTRODUCTION

In the late 1960s, a reform movement began in tenants’ rights. 1 The
old view of the landlord-tenant relationship as an interest in land no
longer applied to most residential tenants, who resided in urban
apartments. 2 These tenants sought more than just pieces of land; they
desired homes in which to live and raise their families. 3 Unlike rural
tenants, however, urban tenants were not able to recognize defects
and complete repairs on their property without assistance. 4 As a
result, tenants living in substandard apartments or rental homes faced
the problem of landlords who still expected them to accept the
property as-is. 5 This attitude had the most devastating effect on lowincome tenants. 6 Because income and race are so often intertwined,
landlords’ reluctance to take responsibility for repairs heavily
affected tenants of color. 7
The growing problem of landlords’ refusal to take responsibility
for their properties’ conditions led courts to establish an implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases. 8 This warranty
converted the leasehold relationship into a bilateral contract requiring
the landlord to provide and maintain basic services (such as heat,
electricity, and sewer service) in exchange for rental income. 9 If the
landlord failed to comply, they had breached the contract, and the
tenant could stop paying rent until the landlord fixed the problems. 10
The establishment of the warranty infuriated landlords who felt
entitled to the continued receipt of rental payments while their
tenants retained possession. 11 In an attempt to appease landlords,
courts established rent escrow (sometimes referred to as “protective
*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Celia Feldman is a third-year day student at the University of Baltimore School of
Law, where she serves as an Associate Comments Editor on Law Review. Celia is a
Research Assistant to Professor Michael Higginbotham and a Law Scholar for
Professor John Lynch’s Property class. Celia recently accepted an offer to clerk for
the Executive Office for Immigration Review in Hyattsville, Maryland following
graduation.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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orders” or “Landlord Protective Orders”), which required tenants to
pay rent into a court’s escrow account while the tenants pursued a
case against their landlord for breach of the warranty. 12 In theory,
success on a tenant’s claim meant they could recover at least some
portion of the money in escrow. 13 If the tenant’s claim failed, the
landlord would receive the money in escrow along with a judgment
for possession. 14 Although rent escrow was at least partially intended
to appease landlords, many tenants’ rights advocates also supported
the measure as a means by which the tenants could show their “good
faith.” 15
This Comment argues that the concept of “good faith” is based on a
moral judgment implying that tenants who fail to make their escrow
payments do not have a meritorious claim. 16 Because the tenants
most likely to struggle with such payments are tenants with the
lowest incomes, this Comment asserts that such a moral judgment is
inextricably linked to these tenants’ poverty. 17 This Comment argues
that such moral judgments tied to poverty have a lengthy foundation
in Anglo-American society and in the American legal system in
particular. The application of such moral judgments in American
Property Law has resulted in an inherently biased application of wellintentioned reforms to the landlord-tenant relationship. 18 Because
low-income tenants are statistically more likely to be people of color,
this Comment argues that the application of such moral judgments in
the context of landlord-tenant law, and in the administration of rent
escrow in particular, has a disparate impact on tenants of color by

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text; see also Jana Ault Phillips & Carol J.
Miller, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: Is Rent Escrow the Solution or the
Obstacle to Tenant's Enforcement?, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1, 25
(2018). Both terms refer to the rent escrow process, but the ways in which this process
is implemented vary between states using “rent escrow” and states using “protective
orders.” See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. In states that use “rent
escrow,” tenants typically request the establishment of the escrow account
affirmatively. See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. In states using a
“protective order” process, landlords request that the court issue a “protective order”
requiring the tenant to pay rent into the escrow account. See infra notes 100–04 and
accompanying text. In this Comment, I use the terms “rent escrow” or “escrow”
throughout for clarity and consistency.
See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Part II; see also infra Part IV.
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depriving them of their leasehold interests in land in violation of the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 19
Part II of this Comment provides background on income-based
societal judgements generally. 20 Section II.A. discusses the
application of such judgments in the modern era, and Section II.B.
discusses how these judgments found their way into American
property law through zoning and how they were ultimately applied in
that context. 21 Sections III.A.–C. offer background on the reforms in
landlord-tenant law and the effectiveness of the warranty of
habitability. 22 Part IV discusses the ongoing biases that low-income
tenants face in the American legal system and in landlord-tenant
court in particular. 23 Part V discusses the ways in which such biases
operate to violate these tenants’ due process rights. 24 Part VI offers
potential solutions to alleviate the problems discussed. 25
II. SOCIETAL JUDGMENTS REGARDING POVERTY
Discrimination based on poverty and race stems from explicit or
implicit bias. 26 Explicit bias reveals discrimination in its most
obvious form—for example, slavery and later segregation in the
Deep South. 27 Implicit bias is not so obvious.28 It occurs when an
individual prefers or abhors one group of people over another but is
unaware of this preference or animosity. 29 These biases come from a
variety of sources, including family values, societal values, and
cultural and media stereotypes. 30 Because people are typically
unaware of the implicit biases they hold, implicit bias takes root
easily, and the assumptions it generates spread throughout society. 31
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra notes 160–64 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 169–72 and
accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infra Sections II.A–B.
See infra Sections III.A–C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 19–21 (3d ed. 2017).
See Two Types of Bias, NAT’L CTR. FOR CULTURAL COMPETENCE,
https://nccc.georgetown.edu/bias/module-3/1.php
[https://perma.cc/V2FV-VETA]
(last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
See Implicit Bias, PERCEPTION INST., https://perception.org/research/implicit-bias/
[https://perma.cc/J6HD-8BXM] (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
Id.
See id.
See id.
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Societal bias against the poor, like racial bias, was originally far
more explicit than it is today. 32 Moral judgments against the poor
date back to Elizabethan England, when impoverished individuals
were classified as being “deserving” or “undeserving.” 33 The
deserving were seen as falling into poverty due to circumstances
beyond their control, while the undeserving did not work despite
their apparent ability to do so. 34 The undeserving appellation was
applied frequently to women and minorities, and the distinction
between the two categories of poor people continued into the
twentieth century. 35
A. Exclusion of Low-Income Americans from Aid Programs Based
on Moral Judgments
The distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor
continued into the twentieth century with the advent of government
aid programs. 36 Such programs tended to favor the deserving at the
expense of the undeserving. 37 Administrators of aid programs
considered the undeserving to be lacking in good moral character
because of their perceived fault in causing their own poverty. 38 The
administrators of such programs and the government entities
supporting them looked upon undeserving individuals with disfavor
for seeking government assistance and denied many such individuals
desperately needed benefits. 39
In the modern era, explicit bias against the poor became less
socially acceptable, but anti-poverty bias did not go away; 40 it merely
took different forms, such as cuts to funding for public housing and
other programs benefiting low-income individuals. 41 Ultimately,
federal and state governments expected people to solve their own
problems and found them deficient if they could not do so. 42
Professor Jaime Lee notes that this attitude, which she refers to as
“culturalism,” only places stigma on poor individuals who seek
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 97, 101 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 101–02.
See id. at 102–03.
See id. at 110–11.
See id.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 110–11.
See, e.g., id. at 124.
See id.
See id. at 107.
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government aid while middle- and higher-income individuals who
seek government assistance do not face the same stigma. 43
Ultimately, only low-income people face stigma and blame when
they attempt to ask the government for help, and because many lowincome people are also women and people of color, this stigma
allows race and gender-based stereotypes to flourish. 44
B. Exclusion of Low-Income Minorities from Communities and
Housing Through Moralistic and Exclusionary Zoning
Stereotypes linking poverty with moral deficiency carried over into
American Property Law with the origins of zoning. 45 In Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court found zoning to be
an acceptable use of localities’ police powers. 46 The Court stated:
The harmless may sometimes be brought within the
regulation or prohibition in order to abate or destroy the
harmful. The segregation of industries, commercial pursuits,
and dwellings to particular [zoning] districts . . . may bear a
rational relation to the health, morals, safety, and general
welfare of the community. The establishment of such
districts . . . may . . . facilitate the suppression of disorder . .
. . 47
Despite the Court’s claim that zoning, morals, and safety were
interconnected, the Court only made broad assumptions on what the
connection might be. 48 The Court also failed to explain how zoning
could “facilitate the suppression of disorder.” 49 However, its
discussion of the supposed problems with apartment buildings
43.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. For instance, Lee notes that tax deductions allow “people to buy what they
could not otherwise afford.” Id. at 104. While tax deductions are a form of
government assistance, individuals who take them do not experience stigma. Id. In
fact, they are essentially expected to take advantage of such opportunities to save
money. See id.
See id. at 104–05 (“In singling out the poor as morally and behaviorally deficient,
culturalism also provides thin cover for the perpetuation of noxious racial and gender
stereotypes.”).
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 392 (emphases added) (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns et al., 149 N.E. 784,
788 (Ill. 1925)).
See id. at 392–95 (failing to elaborate on how zoning protects morals and safety).
See id. (failing to provide an explanation of how zoning could “facilitate the
suppression of disorder”).
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suggests that it believed such buildings and their residents could be
one source of the alleged “disorder.” 50 The Court claimed that
apartment buildings interfered with the development of “detached
house[s],” and that apartments often prevented detached houses from
being built altogether. 51 In these circumstances, the Court said, “the
apartment house is a mere parasite,” and apartments can become
nuisances rather than desirable homes. 52 Because apartment buildings
in the 1920s were more commonly inhabited by low-income urban
workers, many of whom were also women and people of color, the
Court’s decision suggests that it was allowing cities to use zoning as
a tool to facilitate biased land use decisions that would exclude
certain types of people from their communities. 53 Although the
Court’s language was, for the most part, facially neutral, its inability
to articulate a connection between zoning and “suppression of
disorder” or to fully explain how zoning could rationally be linked to
morals suggests a strong bias against potential residents of the
Village of Euclid. 54
Following Euclid, state courts viewed biased zoning restrictions as
acceptable uses of the police power. 55 For example, in Pierro v.
Baxendale, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a city’s
prohibition on building motels. 56 At the time of the Pierro decision,
motels were commonly viewed as places where people went to
engage in immoral conduct. 57 The majority seemed to convey this
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 392, 394–95 (describing apartment houses as “parasites”). Because
tenement buildings and large apartment towers were the most common type of
apartment buildings in the 1920s, and the inhabitants of these buildings were
overwhelmingly poor and often people of color, the Court’s negative attitude towards
such dwellings suggests a strong bias against their occupants. See Deborah S.
Gardner, Notes on New York’s Housing History, THE ARCHITECTURAL LEAGUE NY,
https://archleague.org/article/new-york-housing/ [https://perma.cc/45TP-X942] (last
visited Sept. 21, 2021); see also Lee, supra note 32, at 102 (“In contrast to the
‘worthy’ poor, the ‘unworthy’ or ‘undeserving’ poor have been treated differently.
Those deemed ‘undeserving’ include the seemingly able who do not work,
nonwidowed single mothers, and blacks and other racial minorities.”).
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 394–95.
See Gardner, supra note 50; see also Lee, supra note 32, at 102.
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401, 406 (N.J. 1955).
Id.
Cf. id. at 409 (Heher, J., dissenting) (“Conceding that motels ‘as such are admittedly
not immoral per se,’ it is said in argument that it is the ‘expressed conviction’ of the
mayor and council that ‘such structures offer great temptation to the conduct of
immoral actions’ and the design of the supplement was to ‘remove such temptation,’
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bias when it stated that motels could rationally be prohibited because
they were obliged to serve the general public as a whole and did not
discriminate in the nature of their clientele. 58 In contrast, the majority
considered rooming houses and boarding houses to be more
acceptable within a community because they could carefully pick and
choose their guests and were not open to the general public. 59 These
contrasting assertions suggest that the majority saw motels’ clientele
as being particularly unsavory by default. 60 However, the majority
did not actually establish a link between motels and harm to the
morals or welfare of the communities in which they would be
located, as required by the zoning standards set forth in Euclid. 61
Instead, the majority seemed to adopt moralistic views when it
claimed that “reasonable restrictions designed to preserve the
character of a community and maintain its property values are within
the proper objectives of zoning.” 62
With the Mount Laurel cases of the 1970s, courts finally began to
turn against the practice of using zoning to exclude certain categories
of residents. 63 The Mount Laurel cases were central to this change.64
In New Jersey, Mount Laurel and other townships in the state zoned
their land exclusively for single-family housing and explicitly
prohibited multifamily housing. 65 This prohibition continued despite
changes in the region that brought in new businesses and commercial
industry, resulting in the need for affordable local housing for
employees of the businesses. 66 Due to the lack of affordable housing
nearby, employees frequently had no choice but to live in
substandard housing lacking in basic infrastructure such as
electricity, running water, and sewage systems. 67 When township

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

and to avoid the ‘potential evils’ attending on occasion the operation of such
facilities[.]”).
Id. at 405.
Id.
See id. (implying that motels are unsavory institutions).
See id. at 405–06 (failing to explicitly extrapolate on the connection between motels
and harmful effects on a community’s health and welfare).
See id. at 407.
See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mount Laurel I), 290
A.2d 465, 473 (N.J. Super. 1972), modified, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
See id.; see also Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 727–28 (N.J. 1975); S. Burlington Cnty.
NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J. 1983).
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 290 A.2d at 467.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 719, 723.
Id. at 723.
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officials discussed the problem, they expressed a desire to rid the
township of low-income residents and to “get better citizens.” 68
In the first of the Mount Laurel cases, the New Jersey Superior
Court found that Mount Laurel’s exclusionary zoning practices
constituted economic discrimination and that such discrimination was
invalid. 69 Despite this finding, Mount Laurel and other townships
persisted in their exclusionary zoning efforts, requiring intervention
from the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 70 In two subsequent cases on
the matter, the court held that all townships practicing exclusionary
zoning must stop doing so and must provide a meaningful choice of
housing to residents of all income levels. 71
While the Mount Laurel cases demonstrated a recognition of
blatant economic discrimination generally, courts still failed to
recognize how socioeconomic discrimination in land use decisions
could be inextricably linked to race through implicit bias. 72 In Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., a
nonprofit developer sought to build affordable housing on a large,
undeveloped parcel of land in Arlington Heights, a suburb of
Chicago. 73 At the time of the developer’s effort, Arlington Heights
had 64,000 residents, only twenty-seven of whom were Black. 74 The
housing that the developer wished to build would have provided
affordable housing to residents of Chicago who wished to live closer
to their jobs but could not afford to do so due to a lack of affordable
housing in the suburbs. 75 Many of the residents who would have been
eligible to move into the proposed development were Black. 76
Despite the need for affordable housing in the region, Arlington
Heights opposed the project on the grounds that it would reduce the
property values of the surrounding single-family homes. 77 However,
Arlington Heights provided no evidence to support this claim.78
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

S. Burlington Cnty., NAACP, 290 A.2d at 468.
Id. at 473.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 716–17.
See id. at 727–28; see also Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415 (reaffirming the holding
of Mount Laurel I).
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269–70
(1977).
Id. at 255–56.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 263–64.
See id. at 269.
Id. at 258.
See id. (failing to explain any facts or evidence presented by the residents of the
Village that would support their assertion).
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Despite this lack of substantiation and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
acknowledgement that denying the rezoning would have a “racially
disproportionate impact,” the Court held that the developer and the
individual plaintiffs had to show that Arlington Heights had a
“racially discriminatory intent or purpose” if they wanted to establish
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 79 The Court indicated that
evidence of such intent could include procedural irregularities,
among other factors. 80 However, it found that no such factors were
present in the case and the plaintiffs had therefore failed to show
racially discriminatory intent or purpose behind the denial of the
rezoning. 81
III. REFORMS IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
While striking down exclusionary zoning practices, courts across
the country also changed the fundamental nature of landlord-tenant
law by establishing an implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases. 82 Prior to these reforms, courts viewed landlord-tenant
relationships as being based on an ownership interest in land.83
Landlords and courts expected the tenant to accept the land as-is and
to be able to handle any repairs that might be needed. 84 Under this
view, the only way a tenant could be excused from paying rent was if
he or she vacated the land. 85
A. The Warranty of Habitability
In the 1960s and ‘70s, courts realized that the old view of tenancy
no longer applied to modern-day tenants, the majority of whom were
city dwellers seeking a place to live that offered shelter and basic
utilities.86 Such tenants were not long-term tenants with leaseholds in
land, but shorter-term tenants living in individual apartments or
houses. 87 Furthermore, these modern-day tenants were not in the
same position of being able to spot and make needed repairs. 88
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 264–65, 269–70.
Id. at 266–68.
Id. at 269–70.
See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (Haw. 1969); Tower W. Assocs. v. Derevnuk,
450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951–52 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
Id. at 1077.
Phillips & Miller, supra note 12, at 4.
See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
See id. at 1078.
Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit acknowledged this
problem in Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 89 In Javins, the
court compared modern tenants’ expectations to the expectations of
consumers when buying products. 90 The court found that the
landlord-tenant relationship had come to resemble the manufacturerconsumer relationship, in which warranties of fitness and
merchantability protected buyers’ expectations. 91 In keeping with this
trend, the court held that tenants’ residential leases contained an
implied warranty of habitability, meaning that the landlord, in
signing the lease, guaranteed that the leased premises were suitable
for human habitation. 92 The court held that such leases must be
treated like contracts and that the lease contractually obligated the
landlord to carry out repairs when notified of defects. 93 If the
landlord breached the contract by failing to perform repairs, the
tenant would have a cause of action and could cease paying rent until
the landlord fixed the problems. 94
Subsequent court decisions clarified the scope of the implied
warranty of habitability. 95 New York City’s lower courts clarified
that housing should be habitable and capable of utilization “in accord
with [tenants’] reasonable expectations.” 96 In addition, tenants had a
right to expect not only the provision of basic services but also that
such services would be reliable. 97
B. The Origins of Rent Escrow
Once courts allowed tenants to claim breaches of the implied
warranty of habitability as justification for nonpayment of rent,
landlords sought to protect their right to continue receiving rental
income during the pendency of tenants’ actions. 98 The rent escrow
system resulted from these efforts. 99
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98

Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1074–75.
Id. at 1075–76.
Id. at 1076–77.
Id. at 1075, 1080.
Id. at 1080, 1082.
See, e.g., Tower W. Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951–52 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1982).
See id. at 951.
Id. at 951–52.
See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 389, 428 (2011) (“[Landlord Protective Orders] may be attempts to
appease landlords upset by the recognition of implied covenants of habitability in
residential leases, offering a pretrial rent collection mechanism as a quid pro quo . . . .
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In the rent escrow process, the court creates an escrow account into
which the tenant pays rent until there is a final judgment in their
case. 100 If the tenant succeeds, they may recover at least some of the
money in the escrow account. 101 If the tenant fails, the landlord will
receive all the money. 102 In some states, tenants may affirmatively
request the establishment of the escrow account because they wish to
raise a complaint relating to breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. 103 In other states, rent escrow is a more adversarial
process, in which the landlord requests the issuance of a “protective
order” requiring the tenant to pay rent into the escrow account. 104 If
the tenant in one of these states mentions at the initial hearing that
they have a complaint related to breach of the implied warranty, the
court may schedule a separate hearing on these issues to determine if
they merit a reduction in the amount of rent to be paid into escrow. 105
However, there is no way for the tenant to contest the actual issuance
of the protective order. 106
Although both types of rent escrow processes were intended to
benefit tenants living in substandard housing, in practice they
ultimately punish low-income tenants who may struggle to find the
money for the escrow payments. 107 Courts commonly use the escrow
process as a condition for moving forward with the tenant’s case, and
if the tenant cannot make the payments on time and continuously, the
case will be dismissed. 108 Despite this inequitable result, rent escrow
had the support of advocates of both landlords’ and tenants’ rights

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

[C]ourts were particularly inclined to point to a perceived change in the once
summary nature of eviction proceedings to suggest that landlords deserve assured
collection of any rent owed as compensation for delays.”).
Id. at 425.
E.g., Doug Donovan & Jean Marbella, Dismissed: Tenants Lose, Landlords Win in
Baltimore’s Rent Court, BALT. SUN (Apr. 26, 2017), http://data.baltimoresun.com/
news/dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/62UH-ED9P].
Id.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., D.C. Bar Pro Bono Center, Tenants: Protective Orders and Court Fees,
LAWHELP.ORG, https://www.lawhelp.org/dc/resource/tenants-protective-orders-andcourt-fees [https://perma.cc/BZ9T-3QM2] (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
Id.
See, e.g., Dameron v. Capitol House Assocs., 431 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C. 1981) (holding
that the entry of a protective order cannot be appealed because a protective order does
not constitute a final judgment on the merits).
Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100.
Id.
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who believed that the rent deposits would show the tenants’ “good
faith.” 109
C. Failures of the New Reforms
Despite the fact that rent escrow and the warranty of habitability
were supposed to protect tenants’ interests, the warranty of
habitability often failed to achieve its intended goals. 110 Judges in
landlord-tenant courts tended to overwhelmingly favor the landlords,
even when tenants raised valid claims that the landlord had breached
the warranty. 111 For example, a study of landlord-tenant cases in
Baltimore, Maryland from 2011 to 2012 showed that judges
frequently ignored tenants’ allegations and failed to give legal
reasoning for their decisions or failed to ask questions of the tenants
appearing before them that could elicit findings necessary for a fair
decision. 112 Instances such as these occurred even when tenants
managed to demonstrate blatantly obvious breaches of the
warranty. 113 In other cases, New York City courts failed to provide
meaningful remedies to tenants either because their failure to pay rent
was not based solely on breach of the warranty or because they failed
to provide evidence of the breach that met the court’s standards. 114

109. See Super, supra note 98, at 428–29.
110. See, e.g., Landmarks Restoration Corp. v. Gwardyak, 485 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918–19
(N.Y. Mount Vernon City Ct. 1985) (finding that the court found tenant withheld rent
because of an inability to pay, not for a violation of the warranty of habitability);
Tower W. Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952–53 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982)
(finding that the tenants’ failure of the tenants to log temporal defects in the
habitability of the property in writing offered insufficient proof of such defects,
thereby reducing the damages available to them).
111. See Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research &
Recommendations, 19 CUNY L. REV. 57, 66–67, 73 (2015); see also Landmarks
Restoration Corp., 485 N.Y.S.2d at 918–19; Tower W. Assocs., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
112. Cotton, supra note 111, at 62–63, 66–67.
113. Id. at 73 (“Even where evidence actually indicated that the premises were unfit for
human habitation, judges tended to think that the landlord still ought to get most of
the rental amount set forth in the lease. In one case, the tenant testified about a serious
rodent infestation dating back three years . . . and the [housing] inspector testified as
well . . . even opining that the dwelling was unfit for human habitation. . . . The judge
awarded the tenant a refund of only two months’ rent.”) (emphasis added).
114. Landmarks Restoration Corp., 485 N.Y.S.2d at 918–19 (noting that the tenant
withheld rent partially due to inability to pay, and awarding possession to the landlord
as well as attorneys’ fees); Tower W. Assocs., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 952–53 (awarding
minimal damages to tenants due to their failure to maintain and provide written
records of the landlords’ breach).
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IV. ONGOING SOCIETAL PREJUDICE AGAINST LOWINCOME MINORITIES
Societal bias against low-income individuals continues to this day,
and such bias is frequently linked to race, because racial
discrimination has played a significant role in exacerbating poverty
among minority groups. 115 Stereotypes about both poverty and race
are ingrained in American media, and such stereotypes in turn take
root in the minds of many Americans. 116 In the legal community, the
resulting biases can make it difficult, or even impossible, for lowincome individuals to be heard in a meaningful way. 117
A. Bias Against Low-Income Americans in the Legal Community
According to Michelle Jacobs:
In general, lawyers assume that for most purposes their
clients’ lives are orderly. The client who has the financial
resources to pay a lawyer only comes to see a lawyer when
the unusual or unexpected disrupts the orderly task of living.
Once the interfering or upsetting factor is resolved . . . the
client returns to an orderly life. The client living in poverty
does not fit that description. 118
This conflict of experiences between lawyers and low-income
clients is reflected in the difficulties faced by legal aid programs
seeking to expand. 119 Jacobs notes that the private bar has a history of
stigmatizing pro bono work and has even gone so far as to oppose the
expansion of legal aid programs. 120 Although the private bar has
established some legal aid programs in the past, these programs are
limited in scope and do little to offer long-term solutions to lowincome clients and the communities in which they live. 121
115. See Danieli Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV.
1283, 1288 (2018).
116. Id. at 1333.
117. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 583–85, 588 (1992).
118. Michelle S. Jacobs, Full Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between
Lawyer Values and Client Worthiness, 44 HOW. L.J. 257, 269 (2001) (footnotes
omitted).
119. See id. at 285.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 290 (“The bar had indeed established a tradition of charitable legal work for the
poor, but, though the tradition was supported by the elites of the profession, it
remained in the backwaters of professional interest. These legal rights efforts were
paternalistic, moralistic, and limited in the services they delivered. They conceived
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B. Bias Against Low-Income Americans in Landlord-Tenant Court
When lawyers become judges, they take their biases with them to
the bench. 122 This is particularly noticeable in landlord-tenant court,
where tenants already face the obstacle of an overcrowded docket
being handled by just one or two judges. 123 It appears that some
judges in landlord-tenant court use their biases as a way to clear their
dockets. 124 For example, a study of landlord-tenant court in
Baltimore City found that some of the judges there required tenants
to prove that they provided notice of habitability problems to their
landlord via certified letter, despite City laws permitting multiple
forms of notice. 125 According to the study’s author:
The cultural barrier is the judges’ evident belief that it is “no
big deal” for tenants to write letters or otherwise create
paper trails for what they know. This may be both an
unconscious projection of official legal culture or of a world
view that one pilots one’s own life, grounded in the social
and economic status accompanying judges’ professional
station. 126
A prime example of this cultural barrier is Tower West Associates
v. Derevnuk. 127 In that case, although the judge found that the
landlord had breached the warranty of habitability, the judge
nonetheless claimed that he could not adequately determine the
amount of damages to be awarded because no tenant produced any
written evidence of the breach. 128 While the judge did not discount
the importance of the tenants’ oral testimony, he seemed to believe
that written evidence would be the only way to quantify the extent of
the breach. 129 Because of the judge’s failure to understand that
keeping written records may not have been customary among the

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

their role as handling problems thrust upon them rather than seeking ways to assist the
poor in finding long-term solutions to the problems produced by poverty.”) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
See Bezdek, supra note 117, at 571–72, 588.
See, e.g., id. at 534–35.
See, e.g., id. at 571–73.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted).
See Tower W. Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952–53 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
Id.
See id. at 952 (“While the oral testimony of a witness with regard to certain conditions
is probative if believed, it is not as susceptible to a translation into damages as records
kept, which memorialize those conditions in writing.”).
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affected tenants (and could have been impossible for tenants with
limited literacy), the tenants ultimately suffered financially. 130
C. How Rent Escrow Reflects the Legal Community’s Bias
Rent escrow itself demonstrates the biases held by the legal
profession against low-income (and, by extension, minority)
tenants. 131 Rent escrow reflects the assumption that low-income
tenants, like higher-income lawyers and judges, will make required
payments if they are serious about trying to obtain relief. 132 Both
landlords’ and tenants’ advocates believe that escrow payments are a
means by which tenants can demonstrate their “good faith” and allow
the courts to avoid frivolous claims. 133 By its nature, however, the
concept of good faith implies that a tenant who does not make escrow
payments has a frivolous claim. 134 In other words, such a tenant is
acting in bad faith. 135 Such an assumption fails to account for the fact
that the most vulnerable tenants appearing in landlord-tenant court
are low-income and therefore will struggle to find the money to make
their escrow payments. 136 This does not, however, mean that such
tenants do not have viable claims. 137
130. Id. at 952–53. An argument can be made that, with increased access to smartphones,
tenants may at least be able to take pictures of damage even if they do not habitually
keep written records (or are unable to do so). The problem with this argument is that it
assumes that tenants understand the court’s evidentiary standards in advance. Tenants
with little to no knowledge of the legal system will not necessarily consider the
possibility that their word alone may count for nothing. See Bezdek, supra note 117,
at 588. Aside from this issue, however, the question of whether a tenant could
photograph the defects in her apartment is moot if she is too poor to afford a
smartphone.
131. See Super, supra note 98, at 435–36 (“Judges and clerks commonly assist landlords in
making their cases and refuting their tenants’ cases. Thus landlords, in sharp contrast
to tenants, actually fare better in court unrepresented.”); see also id. at 444 (noting
that Landlord Protective Orders facilitate inequality between landlords and tenants by
failing to prioritize the landlord’s covenant under the warranty of habitability); id. at
446 (noting that courts have eliminated similar payment requirements in other types
of civil cases).
132. See id. at 441 (“Middle-class judges and lawyers . . . pay for their purchases on time
as a matter of pride, and by failing to do so without a deliberate, legally sanctioned
plan, low-income tenants place themselves outside of the middle-class value
system.”).
133. Id. at 429, 441.
134. See id. at 441.
135. Contra id.
136. See Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100.
137. See Super, supra note 98, at 441 (“[L]acking funds is not an indication of dishonesty .
. . .”).
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V. HOW RENT ESCROW VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
A. The Mathews Standard
Because the landlord-tenant court operates under the assumption
that low-income tenants have the same level of understanding of the
court’s procedures as do higher-income tenants, rent escrow violates
low-income minority tenants’ due process rights by depriving them
of their property (their leasehold interests). 138 The U.S. Supreme
Court set the standard for evaluating whether a due process violation
has occurred in the context of prejudgment remedies in Mathews v.
Eldridge. 139 It requires a court to consider:
[T]he private interest that will be affected by the official
action . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value
. . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and . . .
the Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
substitute procedural requirements would entail. 140
The Court further noted that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner[,]’” 141 and that “the degree of potential
deprivation that . . . a particular decision [may create] is a factor [that
courts must] consider[] in assessing the validity of any administrative
decision making process.” 142

138. Cf. id. at 396 (“[P]eople dependent on subsistence benefits, providing far less than
even many part-time minimum wage jobs, nonetheless were [at the time landlordtenant reforms took place] assumed to have the procedural sophistication to initiate
and prosecute claims under a system of legal rules that even the Supreme Court
characterized as ‘an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to attempts
to understand it.’” (quoting Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 n.14
(1985))); id. at 407 (“If the tenant does not understand what to say and when, her or
his abstract awareness of the defense [of the implied warranty of habitability] will be
for naught.”); see also Bezdek, supra note 117, at 567–68 (Landlord-tenant court is a
subset of civil litigation in which wronged parties are expected to bring claims and
that this system expects the party with the weaker argument to settle. This assumption
fails to take into account the existence of other factors that may have prevented the
wronged party from initiating the claim.).
139. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 333 (emphasis added) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
142. Id. at 341.
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B. The Disparate Impact Standard
The Mathews framework presents a good starting point from which
to evaluate whether prejudgment remedies such as rent escrow
violate due process. 143 However, this framework may be insufficient
when a prejudgment remedy disproportionately affects members of a
suspect class, such as people of color. 144 This is important because
the tenants facing the heaviest impact from rent escrow and failures
of the warranty of habitability are low-income and, correspondingly,
non-white. 145 As a result, the failures of the new landlord-tenant
regime appear to have a disparate impact on minority tenants. 146
The disparate impact standard set forth in Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.
provides a promising means by which to evaluate whether a
prejudgment remedy such as rent escrow violates due process. 147 The
disparate impact standard represents an improvement on the disparate
treatment standard used in cases like Village of Arlington Heights in
that, while disparate treatment requires a showing of discriminatory
intent or purpose, disparate impact simply requires a showing that the
defendant engaged in practices that “have a ‘disproportionately
adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a
legitimate rationale.” 148 Once this adverse effect is established, the
defendant must show that there are no “less discriminatory
alternatives” that it can use to advance its interests. 149 Unlike
disparate treatment, disparate impact allows “plaintiffs to counteract
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy
classification as disparate treatment.” 150 In other words, disparate
impact provides a means of accounting for the implicit bias of
individual defendants, systems, or institutions.151
143. See infra notes 186–200 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., DAN PASCIUTI & MICHELE COTTON, PUB. JUST. CTR., JUSTICE DIVERTED:
HOW RENTERS ARE PROCESSED IN THE BALTIMORE CITY RENT COURT 12, 15 (Dec.
2015),
http://www.publicjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/JUSTICE
_DIVERTED_PJC_DEC15.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK4Z-QRB8].
145. See, e.g., id. at v (providing demographic information on tenants appearing in rent
court in Baltimore City).
146. See id. at 15.
147. See discussion infra at Section V.C.
148. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. (Inclusive
Cmtys.), 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577
(2009)).
149. Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 526.
150. Id. at 540.
151. See id.
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C. Due Process Evaluations of Rent Escrow
Despite the promise of the disparate impact standard, courts have
only applied it in employment discrimination cases and to cases
involving violations of the Fair Housing Act. 152 Meanwhile, rent
escrow has been evaluated under the Mathews standard, which has
resulted in it being found not to violate due process. 153
1.

Arguments That Rent Escrow Does Not Violate Due Process

The U.S. Supreme Court case of Lindsey v. Normet provides a
pivotal example of the consequences of rent escrow being evaluated
under the Mathews framework. 154 In Lindsey, the Court stated that
the Constitution does not provide a remedy for the loss of shelter and
the right to retain possession. 155 It noted that “[t]he tenant is, by
definition, in possession of the property of the landlord” 156 and that it
was the duty of the courts both to prevent the tenant from depriving
the landlord of the right to his or her income derived from the
property and to prevent the landlord from taking the law into his or
her own hands by summarily repossessing the property. 157 The Court
noted that protective orders assist with “speedy adjudication,” which
it stated “is desirable to prevent subjecting the landlord to undeserved
economic loss[.]” 158 Furthermore, the Court found that protective
orders could not be considered “irrational or oppressive” because
“[i]t is customary to pay rent in advance, and the simplicity of the
issues in the typical [Forcible Entry and Detainer] action will usually
not require extended trial preparation and litigation, thus making the
posting of a large security deposit unnecessary.” 159
152. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 540; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592; Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
153. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73–74 (1972) (employing rational basis review
of the statute in question under the Equal Protection Clause because the “assurance of
adequate housing” is a “legislative, not judicial, function[]” beyond the reach of the
Constitution). Even though the Mathews decision came after Lindsey was decided,
Lindsey tracked the same considerations set forth in the Mathews test. NAT’L HOUS. L.
PROJECT, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO EVICTIONS DURING THE COVID19 PANDEMIC 2 (2020), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/procedural-dueprocess-covid-evictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S3R-WNEK].
154. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73–74; see also NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJECT, supra note 153, at
2 (explaining how the Mathews framework is consistent with the Lindsey holding).
155. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73–74.
156. Id. at 72.
157. Id. at 72–73.
158. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 65.
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How Rent Escrow Does in Fact Violate Tenants’ Right to Due
Process

Use of the disparate impact analysis reveals how rent escrow, as
currently practiced, does in fact violate due process. Studies clearly
show that the vast majority of tenants who lose their homes to
eviction because they cannot bring their warranty of habitability
cases through the rent escrow process are low-income tenants. 160 Due
to historical and ongoing racial discrimination, such tenants are also
overwhelmingly people of color. 161 This pattern clearly demonstrates
that rent escrow, as applied, has a “disproportionately adverse effect
on minorities.” 162
There is no legitimate basis for this discrepancy. As discussed
earlier, rent escrow often results in cases being dismissed due to
factors that are outside of tenants’ control and that are inextricably
linked to their poverty. These factors include an inability to provide
written records that meet the court’s standards; inability to pay rent
into escrow on short notice (or at all); and judges’ assumptions that,
when tenants fail to comply with court procedures, their claims must
be frivolous. 163 However, there is no rational basis to essentially
make the assumption that tenants who cannot comply with the
requirements of the current rent escrow system deserve to have their
cases dismissed. 164
Given the objectives behind the rent escrow system at its inception,
it is clear that rent escrow, as it should be applied, would be the “less
160. See, e.g., Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100.
161. See Peterman, supra note 115, at 1288 (“Due to past and ongoing racial
discrimination, poverty rates are higher among many minority racial groups. Hence,
many policies and practices that discriminate based on poverty have a disparate racial
impact.”); see also PASCIUTI & COTTON, supra note 144, at 12–13 (providing
demographic information on tenants appearing in rent court in Baltimore City);
OKSANA MIRONOVA, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, ADDRESSING THE EVICTION EPIDEMIC 2, 5
(2018),
https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/
Addressing_the_Eviction_Epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LRB-XULC] (providing
demographic information on tenants vulnerable to evictions in New York City);
BRIAN J. MCCABE & EVA ROSEN, EVICTION IN WASHINGTON, D.C.: RACIAL AND
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN HOUSING INSTABILITY 6, 15, 21 (2020),
https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/8cq4p8ap4nq5xm75b5mct0nz5002z3ap
[https://perma.cc/M466-DVAN] (providing demographic information on tenants
subject to evictions in Washington, D.C.).
162. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. (Inclusive
Cmtys.), 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015).
163. Tower W. Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982);
Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100; Super, supra note 98, at 441, 446.
164. See, e.g., Super, supra note 98, at 441.
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discriminatory alternative” to use to advance the interests of both
sides. 165 Rent escrow was intended to provide a means by which
tenants could request enforcement of the bilateral contract (the lease)
between themselves and their landlords while also protecting the
landlord’s interest if the tenant asserted a frivolous claim. 166 When
utilized correctly, the system would allow the tenant to assert a
violation of the warranty (in the affirmative process) or defend
themselves based on such a violation (in the defensive version of the
process). 167 After a meaningful evaluation of the claim, the court
would either release escrow funds to the landlord to make repairs
within a specified time and return the balance to the tenant while
abating rent for the period in which the violations were ongoing or it
would release the escrow funds to the landlord and grant a judgment
for possession. 168 In reality, however, judges’ biases towards tenants
result in a rent escrow process that fails to grant tenants a meaningful
opportunity to present a case and, more often than not, results in a
judgment for possession for the landlord. 169
Viewed from this perspective, the Court’s decision in Lindsey
clearly reflects a bias against low-income tenants and in favor of
landlords (who tend to have higher incomes and more familiarity
with the court system). 170 By assuming that, without a protective
order in place, the tenant would deprive the landlord of rental income
without a good reason for doing so, the Court automatically assumes
that tenants who do not make escrow payments do not have a
meritorious case for nonpayment of rent. 171 The Court’s statement
that “it is customary to pay rent in advance” reflects the assumption
that all tenants are able to do so but fails to consider the fact that the
cases that established the warranty of habitability allowed a tenant to
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 526.
See Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100; see also Super, supra note 98, at 428.
Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100; D.C. Bar Pro Bono Center, supra note 104.
Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100.
See supra Sections IV.B–C.
See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972) (stating that Landlord Protective
Orders are not “irrational or oppressive” and that in most cases their amount will be
small); see also id. at 72 (stating that “[t]here are unique factual and legal
characteristics of the landlord-tenant relationship that justify special statutory
treatment inapplicable to other litigants[]” and that, without a Landlord Protective
Order, a tenant could deprive his or her landlord of the right to rental income); cf.
Bezdek, supra note 117, at 556 (observing that very few small landlords appeared in
Baltimore’s landlord-tenant court).
171. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 72–73 (describing the landlord’s prospective deprivation as
“undeserved”).
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stop paying rent when the landlord breached the warranty. 172
Furthermore, although the Court states that the amount of the security
deposit would not be large (and therefore could not be “irrational or
oppressive”), the Court fails to consider that, for low-income tenants,
asking them to pay any excess money into escrow is oppressive for
people who do not have the financial resources to do so and cannot
easily obtain such resources. 173
Lindsey and other cases argue that the landlord has a
constitutionally protected property interest in the rental income
derived from his or her property. 174 However, the tenant also has a
property interest in retaining his or her leasehold. 175 The Lindsey
Court appeared to consider this latter interest not subject to the same
constitutional protections as the landlord’s interest because the
Constitution does not protect a right to housing.176 However, while a
right to housing may not be a property interest within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause, a leasehold interest in property is a property
interest. 177 While the Lindsey Court seemed to think that the escrow
payments are a necessary cost of doing business in landlord-tenant
court, the warranty of habitability cases changed the nature of the
leasehold interest by making all residential leases bilateral contracts
containing an implied warranty of habitability. 178 If a tenant has
alleged a breach of contract (a breach of the warranty), placing the
burden of payment upon the non-breaching party (the tenant) is not
consistent with basic principles of contract law. 179
Although the affirmative rent escrow process appears to offer more
protection to tenants by allowing them to request that the escrow
account be established, in practice this process also violates tenants’
172. Id. at 65; Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
173. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65 (stating that Landlord Protective Orders are not “irrational or
oppressive” and that in most cases their amount will be small); Cf. Nicole Summers,
The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV.
145, 164 (2020) (noting that tenants often use the rent withheld due to breach of the
warranty to fix problems on their own).
174. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 72–73; see also Chernin v. Welchans, 844 F.2d 322, 325 (6th
Cir. 1988).
175. See Super, supra note 98, at 443–44 (“Arguments that [Landlord Protective Orders]
are required to avoid depriving landlords of property without due process of the law
cannot bear serious scrutiny . . . the supposed deprivation of property suffered by a
landlord . . . is no different from that suffered by any plaintiff with a meritorious
claim.”).
176. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74.
177. Super, supra note 98, at 448.
178. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–23 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
179. See Super, supra note 98, at 429.
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right to due process by depriving them of the opportunity to be
heard. 180 In Doug Donovan and Jean Marbella’s recent study of
Baltimore City’s rent escrow court, for example, tenants who filed
complaints against their landlords still had their cases dismissed if
they could not make their escrow payments, even where the landlord
had clearly breached the warranty of habitability.181 Even when
tenants did get the opportunity to present their claim for breach of the
warranty, judges often sided with the landlords, telling tenants that
they could not live “rent-free” and asking them why they waited to
file their complaints. 182 Judges displayed this attitude even when City
housing inspectors or the Maryland Department of the Environment
had fined or cited landlords and property management companies
renting substandard properties. 183 In general, judges’ sympathies
tended to align with the landlords, who often accused tenants of
making up problems to avoid paying rent or blamed the tenant for
damage they caused. 184 Because the judges overwhelmingly took the
landlords’ side and disregarded both tenants’ testimony and objective
evidence provided by city and state officials, the rent escrow process
ultimately left tenants with an empty opportunity to present their
defenses. 185
Because the rent escrow process deprives tenants of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used” 186 is significant for the
tenants. 187 A landlord may lose a month or two of rent while a
180. See generally Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100.
181. Id. One tenant had a rodent infestation, leaking pipes, and no heat, and a housing
inspector had taken photographs of the defects in the property. Id. After her case was
dismissed due to her inability to make escrow payments, the tenant filed another
complaint regarding additional problems that arose. Id. The judge told the tenant that
she had seven days to pay $3,600 that the landlord claimed was due. Id. The judge
explicitly told the tenant that she would dismiss the case if the tenant did not pay the
requested amount into the escrow account. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. While it is certainly possible that some complaints are frivolous, it is also hard to
see how tenants would create some of the problems alleged. See id. For example, one
tenant in the study had to contend with their dining room ceiling falling in—an event
far more likely to be the result of poor construction and neglected repairs. Id.
185. See generally id.
186. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
187. See Cotton, supra note 111, at 66–67, 77 (observing that judges in Baltimore's
landlord-tenant court used procedures that tenants had difficulty following, that
judges failed to elicit facts from tenants or to use legal reasoning in their findings, and
that judges often required tenants to pay their back rent into escrow before they could
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tenant’s case proceeds to its conclusion.188 While this loss may be
more significant for small-scale landlords, it is negligible for large
commercial landlords. 189 Any impact of such a loss, however, must
be measured against the fact that, where a tenant has a meritorious
case for breach of the warranty, it is logical for the landlord to face
some sort of penalty if he or she has made no attempt to fix the
problems alleged. 190 In contrast, a tenant faces the far greater loss of
a place to live, which is not so easily remedied, and such a
deprivation is far more likely to be erroneous than would be the
deprivation of a landlord’s interest. 191 Many landlords frequently
appear in landlord-tenant court and are familiar with the system, and
they often receive assistance from court personnel and from the
judges involved in the proceedings. 192 In contrast, tenants receive
little notice prior to their hearings and rarely have any realistic
opportunity to obtain counsel. 193 Tenants are often intimidated by the
court proceedings, with which they are not familiar, and they do not
receive assistance from court personnel and judges in eliciting the
facts necessary to present their cases. 194 As a result, many tenants fail

188.
189.

190.
191.

192.
193.

194.

proceed with their cases); Bezdek, supra note 117, at 588 (“[T]he rule-oriented court
talk expected and privileged by judges in low-level courts bears little or no relation to
people's natural narratives. The rules of courtroom discourse are seldom explained to
those witnesses expected to conform to them.”).
See, e.g., Super, supra note 98, at 443–44.
See Bezdek, supra note 117, at 556. Although small landlords are more prevalent in
some jurisdictions, such as Baltimore City, and are therefore more likely to face
financial hardship from delayed receipt of rental income, it is important to consider
that landlords are in the best position to know the condition of their properties at the
time of rental. See Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100. If a landlord knows that
their property is not fit for human habitation, they should not rent it out in the first
place. Cf. Super, supra note 98, at 429 (“[R]equiring the buyer to pay the purchase
price to a breaching seller to correct the latter’s noncompliance is hardly standard in
contract law.”).
Super, supra note 98, at 401.
See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 85 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“For slum
tenants—not to mention the middle class—this kind of summary procedure usually
will mean in actuality no opportunity to be heard. Finding a lawyer in two days,
acquainting him with the facts, and getting necessary witnesses make the theoretical
opportunity to be heard and interpose a defense a promise of empty words.”).
Super, supra note 98, at 436.
See, e.g., Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation,
Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court,
7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 8, 16–17 (1973) (describing how the Detroit court set cases
for trial one week after the landlord’s filing of a complaint and noting that many
tenants were not served until three days before the court date).
See Bezdek, supra note 117, at 574–75 (“Tenant education in the rent court consists
of a set of direct and powerful instructions. Informed by the judge’s formal
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to speak up and state their cases adequately. 195 Even when tenants do
speak up, some judges proceed to disregard their claims without
further investigation while others discount their claims due to their
failure to present evidence that meets the judge’s standards. 196
Because the risk that tenants will be erroneously deprived of their
property interest is so great, the value of procedural safeguards
should be significant. 197
The government’s interest in protecting tenants is significant
because tenants asserting breaches of the warranty of habitability
often address claims related to sanitation problems and other health
and safety hazards. 198 Having safe and healthy housing that is fit for
human habitation is an extremely compelling government interest
because it prevents homelessness and generally serves the public
health and general welfare. 199 Although there would be a significant
burden on the government in implementing procedural safeguards,
since none currently exist, the government interest seems sufficiently
compelling to offset such a burden. 200

195.
196.
197.
198.

199.

200.

instructions at the start of the docket, tenants are told that they cannot raise conditions
issues if they did not have the foresight to write a letter, mail it certified, and keep a
copy. Tenants see the judge try the landlords’ cases. Tenants observe that few tenants
participate or have much to say . . . . Tenants are placed under a different burden of
production, presentation, and persuasion. The court makes no reference to tenants’
rights and no admonishment to landlords at the start of the docket in order to honor
tenants’ entitlements.”).
See id. at 578.
See id. at 586; see also Tower W. Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1982).
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
See Super, supra note 98, at 449; see also, C.F. Seabrook Co. v. Beck, 417 A.2d 89,
91–92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (finding numerous defective conditions likely
to affect public health, including raw sewage accumulating beneath the house); Surratt
v. Newton, 393 S.E.2d 554, 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (noting defective conditions
included “flooding of sewage” and rodent infestation); Pleasant E. Assocs. v. Cabrera,
480 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (noting defective conditions that
included a water leak near a bedroom electrical socket and “a rodent, roach and
vermin infestation throughout the apartment . . . .”).
See Housing and Homelessness as a Public Health Issue, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policystatements/policy-database/2018/01/18/housing-and-homelessness-as-a-public-healthissue [https://perma.cc/6JG4-Q73Z].
Cf. e.g., id. (noting that unstable housing is one factor predictive of excessive
emergency room visits and that lack of affordable housing contributes to housing
instability).
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The problems presented in this Comment do not have easy
solutions.201 It seems clear that tenants desperately need assistance to
navigate the rent escrow system and to have their claims heard in a
meaningful way. 202 Know-your-rights presentations from legal aid
attorneys or volunteers from the private bar could be a good start, but
this is not enough. 203 Such presentations only go so far when implicit
bias against poor client-tenants is deeply entrenched within the legal
community itself. 204
Given the presence of implicit bias within the legal community, it
is important to start with measures to help attorneys and judges
understand and overcome their biases. 205 One possible strategy is for
cities and states to provide implicit bias training. 206 Aside from the
obstacle of obtaining funding for such training, however, it is
important to note that the judges and attorneys most in need of such
training (the ones who show the most biased attitudes and results in
their courtrooms) are also the people likely to be most resistant to
such training. 207
Overcoming this obstacle, then, seems to be more rooted in fixing
the reasons behind judges’ and attorneys’ bias. 208 The American legal
system prizes high grades, law school rankings, and law journal
membership (among other things)—all goals that are statistically
much more likely to be obtained by white law students from
socioeconomically privileged backgrounds. 209 The racial disparities
in law schools’ means of advancement result in racial disparities in
201. See, e.g., supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 125–30, 192–96 and accompanying text.
203. See Heidi Schultheis & Caitlin Rooney, A Right to Counsel is a Right to a Fighting
Chance, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/right-counsel-right-fighting-chance/
[https://perma.cc/UT8Y-C48D]; but see supra notes 122–36 and accompanying text.
204. See discussion supra Part IV.
205. See discussion supra Part IV.
206. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Lawyers are Uniquely Challenging Audience for Anti-Bias
L.
(May
13,
2019,
4:51
AM),
Training,
BLOOMBERG
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/lawyers-are-uniquely-challengingaudience-for-anti-bias-training [https://perma.cc/6RKF-7YZL].
207. See id.
208. Cf. supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text (observing that anti-poverty bias in
the legal community stems at least partially from deeply entrenched, pervasive
societal stereotypes and fromvast differences between the day-to-day lives of
attorneys and low-income Americans).
209. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, Guests in Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate
Bar Performance, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 770–77, 781–86 (1996).
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who ultimately becomes a lawyer. 210 This represents a significant
problem for tenants trying to find a genuine advocate, as a lawyer
from a more privileged background is likely to have more difficulty
empathizing with a client from a less privileged background. 211
While this is certainly not true of all such lawyers, it does help to
explain the pervasive bias among lawyers and judges, particularly
when it comes to the idea that tenants need to show “good faith”
when pursuing a warranty of habitability claim or in assuming that
tenants understand court procedures and how they should conduct
themselves in their hearings. 212 Resolving this problem will take
time, but if the legal community puts meaningful effort into allowing
a more diverse range of law students to have an equal opportunity to
succeed tenants may have access to lawyers who are able to provide
meaningful help to them. 213
In the meantime, states and court systems can put measures in
place to make landlord-tenant proceedings more meaningfully
accessible to tenants. 214 Some states, including Maryland, now
provide tenants in eviction proceedings with a right to counsel.215
While Maryland only recently implemented its program, right to
counsel programs in other cities, such as New York City and
Cleveland, have shown signs of success. 216
VII. CONCLUSION
Implicit bias clearly has a pervasive influence in rent escrow
proceedings and represents a serious obstacle to reform. 217 However,
without such reforms, low-income minority tenants will continue to

210. See Paul Willison, Comment, Rethinking the Writing Competition: Developing
Diversity Policies on Law Journals after FASORP I and II, 71 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
351, 359–60, 372–73 (2020); see also Allison E. Laffey & Allison Ng, Diversity and
Inclusion in the Law: Challenges and Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 2, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/jiop/articles/2018/diversity
-and-inclusion-in-the-law-challenges-and-initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/KFV7-8AZ3].
211. See quotations cited supra notes 118, 126.
212. See Super, supra note 98, at 396, 429.
213. See Willison, supra note 210, at 358–60; see also Laffey & Ng, supra note 210.
214. Donovan & Marbella, supra note 100 (describing measures under consideration in
Maryland to improve the situation of tenants in rent escrow proceedings).
215. Maryland’s Right to Counsel Protects Renters from Eviction, NAT’L LOW INCOME
HOUS.
COAL. (Sept. 30, 2021), https://nlihc.org/resource/marylands-rightcounsel-protects- renters-eviction [https://perma.cc/336E-QM8Y].
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 122–37 and accompanying text.
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be deprived of their property interests in violation of due process. 218
Providing tenants with counsel is a good start, but wider changes to
the legal system are necessary to make truly meaningful impacts and
to allow tenants to make their cases heard. 219

218. See supra notes 184–97 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part VI.

